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NOTES AND COMMENT
the respondents urged that the business under consideration afforded
an especially fertile ground for the cultivation of the evils of extortion,
fraud, imposition, discrimination, and The like.
In arriving at its conclusion, the court considered these propositions:
It is granted that where businesses are devoted to public use, and the
public has an interest in the business, i.e., is vitally affected by the
operation of--such business, the legislature has the power to regulate
prices. 2 But the phrase "affected with the public interest" demands
careful consideration. The mere declaration by a legislature that a
business is affected with a public interest is not conclusive of the
question whether its attempted regulation on that ground is justified.3
The circumstances which clothe a particular kind of business with a
public interest in fhe sense that the power to regulate prices follows,
must be such as to create a peculiarly close relation between the public
and those engaged in it, and raise implications of an affirmative obliga-
tion on their part to be reasonable in dealing with the public.4  So,
where Congress enacted a law fixing minimum wages for women and
children in the District of Columbia, it was held invalid insofar as it
affected women as an arbitrary interference with the right to contract
in respect of terms of private employment. 5 And also, where an act of
the New York Legislature sought to fix the price at which theater
tickets should be sold by a ticket broker, such act was held invalid.
The business of an employment agency is essentially a brokerage. There
is no substantial difference between a real estate broker, merchandise
broker, ticket broker, or employment broker as regards the character
of the several undertakings. In none of these pursuits, however, does
the interest of the public approach the interest the law contemplates
as the basis for legislative price control.7
The evils attendant upon the operation of an employment agency
render it subject to regulation, but not to price fixing.8
STEWART G. HONECK
Equal Protection of the Laws: Constitutional Law: Classification.
The case of Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania arose thus:
A tax was placed upon the gross receipts of the Quaker City Cab
Co., a foreign corporation doing business in the State of Pennsylvania.
The statute read that every transportation company, foreign and
' Wolff Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S. 522.
'Idem.
'Idem.
'Adkins v. Childrei's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525.
'Tysons and Brother v. Banton, supra.
'Wolff Co. v. Industrial Coui't, supra.
' Tysons and Brother v. Banton, supra.
1 48 Sup. Ct. 553.
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domestic, owning or operating any device for the transportation of
passengers "shall pay to the state treasurer a tax of eight mills upon
the dollar, upon the gross receipts of said corporation received from
passengers transported wholly within the state." The plaintiff claimed
that if such tax is applied to the gross receipts of the corporation, the
statute violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. The plaintiff further contended
that because the tax was placed upon corporations only, and not upon
individuals or partnerships, the classification was discriminatory. The
state contended that it possessed the right to classify and therefore
could tax the corporations differently than individuals and partnerships.
A foreign corporation within the jurisdiction of a state is protected
by the equal protection clause and is guaranteed the equal protection
of the laws as regards other corporations doing the same kind of
business. The state has the right to classify for the purpose of taxa-
tion, but the classification must be reasonable and based upon real and
substantial differences and not arbitrary or unjust. The statute divides
the taxicab business into two classes: those operating as corporations
and those doing business as individuals and partnerships. The former
is taxed while the latter is not. Such classification is unreasonable
and is not based upon real and substantial differences. The statute
therefore was held to violate the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment.
Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote a forceful dissenting opinion to the
ruling in this case, stating that the policy of Pennsylvania since 1840
has been to tax businesses conducted by corporations heavier than those
conducted by individuals and partnerships. The equal protection clause,
he states, merely requires that the classification be reasonable. To
place corporations in one class and businesses conducted by individuals
in another is a reasonable classification. The difference between the
two is a real and important one. To conduct a business in a corporate
form is far more advantageous than to conduct such business as a
partnership or individual. The thing taxed is not the dealing in
merchandise, but the privilege of doing business in a corporate form.
Therefore the Pennsylvania statute imposing heavier taxes on corpora-
tions does not violate the equal protection clause.
The Wisconsin cases on this question seem to lean more favorably
toward the dissenting opinion. In Chicago and Northwestern Ry. v.
State,2 it was held that it was within the discretion of the legislature
to place railroad corporations in a class by themselves for taxing
purposes, but the taxation as to such classes shall be uniform. Bern-
- 128 W. 553.
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hard Stern and Son v. Bodden3 holds that if the rule of taxation is
uniform, proper classification may be made and different rates applied
to each class. Classification, however, must be based upon substantial
distinction which make real differences, is the ruling of Kily v. Chi-
cago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. Co.4 The state can tax all privileges
or select certain classes leaving others untaxed. Beals v. State.5 In the
case of Pick v. Rubicon Hydraulic Co., the court held that the legis-
lature can impose other restrictions upon corporations as to method of
acquiring easements, than those applied to individuals.
LEwis I. CoaL-N
Taxation: State Taxation of Federal Agencies and Instrumentali-
ties.
The application of the doctrine prohibiting state interference with
the agencies and the instrumentalities of the federal government has
been greatly enlarged by two recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court. Both of the cases were decided by a divided court,
and it would seem from a summary review of the decided cases and
the principles therein enunciated that the limits of the application of
this doctrine are reached in this type of case.
The first of these cases is that of Long v. Rockford, 48 S.Ct. 463,
in which it was held that royalties for use of patents cannot be taxed
by the states. The argument being, that the primary object in granting
and securing the monopoly to the inventor was the benefit to the public
and community at large and secondarily to promote the progress of sci-
ence and the useful arts. That the patent is the instrument by which
that end is accomplished, and like a franchise granted by the United
States is not subject to state taxation. If the state "cannot tax the
.patent, it cafnnot tax the royalties received from its use."
The second case arose under a law enacted by the state of Missis-
sippi providing that dealers in gasoline shall pay for the privilege of
engaging in such business an excise tax of a designated amount per
gallon upon the sale of gasoline. Defendant company sold gas to the
United States Government for use in operation of Coast Guard fleet
and Veteran's IHospital. The company defended the action brought
to-recover taxes levied on this sale with the contention that the tax
was void since it was an interference with the instrumentalities of the
federal government. This view was upheld by the Supreme Court in
Panhandle v. State of Mississippi, 48 S.Ct. 451. Quoting Mr. Justice
165 Wis. 75.
4 142 W. 154.
139 W. 544.
27 W. 433.
